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I. INTRODUCTION 
Although their express purpose is to adjudicate disputes, courts 
by their institutional design encourage civil litigants to settle their 
differences without resorting to trial.  Most civil systems impose filing 
fees, pleading requirements, and a highly formalized presentation of 
evidence; also, because of crowded civil dockets, courts typically 
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require litigants to wait months, or even years, for their trial date.1  
For these reasons, and because of the increasing costs of legal 
representation,2 it is not surprising that the majority of litigants settle 
before trial.3  Notwithstanding these measures, federal courts and 
most state courts have an additional mechanism to encourage 
settlement, generally known as an offer-of-judgment rule. 
Following the leads of Minnesota, Montana, and New York, the 
Supreme Court promulgated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 
(hereinafter “Rule 68”) in 1937.4  Briefly stated,5 the rule allows a 
defending party—at her discretion—to submit a formal settlement 
offer to the court6 as well as to the claimant.  If the plaintiff does not 
accept the offer and does not ultimately recover an amount greater 
than the proposed settlement,7 then she is required to pay the 
defendant’s post-offer court costs.  Although the original Advisory 
 
 1. See, e.g., George L. Priest, Private Litigants and the Court Congestion Problem, 69 B.U. 
L. REV. 527, 532 (1989) (describing how civil court suit-to-trial delays averaged 4.71 years and 
average incident-to-trial delays were 5.68 years). 
 2. See Lester Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates of Contingency Fee Lawyers: Competing 
Data and Non-Competitive Fees, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 653, 655 (2003) (noting that in the 1960-2001 
period, inflation-adjusted hourly rates of tort plaintiffs’ lawyers have increased 1000% to 1400%). 
 3. See Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, “Most Cases Settle”: Judicial Promotion and 
Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1340 (1994) (noting that two-thirds of civil 
cases settle without any court involvement). 
 4. See 12A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3001 
(2005) (discussing the history and purpose of Rule 68). 
 5. The rule states in full: 
At any time more than 10 days before the trial begins, a party defending against a 
claim may serve upon the adverse party an offer to allow judgment to be taken 
against the defending party for the money or property or to the effect specified in the 
offer, with costs then accrued. If within 10 days after the service of the offer the 
adverse party serves written notice that the offer is accepted, either party may then 
file the offer and notice of acceptance together with proof of service thereof and 
thereupon the clerk shall enter judgment. An offer not accepted shall be deemed 
withdrawn and evidence thereof is not admissible except in a proceeding to determine 
costs. If the judgment finally obtained by the offeree is not more favorable than the 
offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred after the making of the offer. The fact 
that an offer is made but not accepted does not preclude a subsequent offer. When the 
liability of one party to another has been determined by verdict or order or judgment, 
but the amount or extent of the liability remains to be determined by further 
proceedings, the party adjudged liable may make an offer of judgment, which shall 
have the same effect as an offer made before trial if it is served within a reasonable 
time not less than 10 days prior to the commencement of hearings to determine the 
amount or extent of liability. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 68. 
 6. To avoid prejudice, the court is not informed of the offer unless it has either been 
accepted, or invoked by the offeror following trial. 13 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S 
FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 68.04[2] (3d ed. 2004). 
 7. For example: Pursuant to Rule 68, D offers P $1000 to settle their dispute. P does not 
accept the offer. At trial, P wins a judgment of $800. P is entitled to the judgment, but must pay 
D’s post-offer court costs. See MOORE ET AL., supra note 6, ¶ 68.06[1] (noting the cost-shifting 
consequences of a plaintiff’s failure to accept a Rule 68 offer). 
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Committee Note said nothing about the purpose of the rule, it is 
generally understood that it was designed to “promote settlements and 
avoid protracted litigation”8 and, in so doing, provide a secondary 
benefit of reducing the caseload burden present in most jurisdictions.9  
Most states subsequently adopted their own offer-of-judgment rules; 
the vast majority of these rules were modeled after the federal 
version.10 
At their core, offer-of-judgment rules are about influencing the 
quantity and quality of cases that go to trial, an issue that scholars 
have spiritedly debated.11  In examining offer-of-judgment rules, 
economists and legal scholars have focused on Rule 68, not 
surprisingly given the rule’s primacy at both the state and federal 
level.  The scholarship has been primarily theoretical,12 with 
considerable debate as to the rule’s efficacy.  The few scholars who 
have examined the rule from an empirical perspective have done so 
through experimental data,13 finding only modest effects.14 
This Article extends the existing scholarship in two significant 
ways.  First, we direct our focus on an offer-of-judgment rule other 
 
 8. See MOORE ET AL., supra note 6, ¶ 68.02[2]. 
 9. See Monida Wiseman Latin, Avoiding Disaster: The Applicability of Federal Rule 68 
When Multiple Offers of Judgment Result in a Settlement, 12 REV. LITIG. 687, 696 (1993) 
(suggesting that “the purpose of rule 68 is to facilitate the speedier resolution of disputes and 
minimize the use of an overloaded judicial system”). 
 10. See Michael E. Solimine & Bryan Pacheco, State Court Regulation of Offers of Judgment 
and Its Lessons for Federal Practice, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 51, 79-81, app. A (1997) 
(noting that 30 out of the 42 states that have offer-of-judgment rules modeled them on Rule 68). 
 11. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, The Level of Litigation: Private Versus Social Optimality of 
Suit and of Settlement, 19 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 99 (1999); Steven Shavell, The Fundamental 
Divergence Between the Private and the Social Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 
575 (1997); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Welfare Implications of Costly 
Litigation for the Level of Liability, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1988); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel 
L. Rubinfeld, The Deterrent Effects of Settlement and Trials, 8 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 109 (1988); 
Louis Kaplow, Private Versus Social Costs in Bringing Suit, 15 J. LEG. STUD. 371 (1986). 
 12. See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk & Howard Chang, The Effect of Offer-of-Settlement Rules on 
the Terms of Settlement, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 489 (1999) (developing a model of bargaining under 
offer-of-settlement rules); Tai-Yeong Chung, Settlement of Litigation Under Rule 68: An 
Economic Analysis, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 261 (1996) (suggesting that Rule 68 can be made more 
efficient by revising it so that a plaintiff awarded a judgment that is not more favorable than the 
defendant’s offer would pay the defendant’s post-offer cost to a third party). 
 13. Experimental data are data that have been obtained by running a controlled 
experiment (e.g., mock trials). 
 14. See, e.g., Brian G.M. Main & Andrew Park, The Impact of Defendant Offers into Court 
on Negotiation in the Shadow of the Law: Experimental Evidence, 22 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 177, 
188-89 (2002) (concluding that offer based fee-shifting rules do not significantly affect propensity 
to settle); David A. Anderson & Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Empirical Evidence on Settlement Devices: 
Does Rule 68 Encourage Settlement?, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 519, 534 (1995) (“[S]tandard 
regression analysis suggests that Rule 68 would decrease minimum ask levels by 7 percent and 
decrease maximum bid levels by 14 percent.”). 
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than Rule 68.  The federal rule, notwithstanding the scholarly 
attention, has long been regarded by practitioners and jurists as 
largely inconsequential.  The cost-shifting mechanism of Rule 68 and 
the state rules modeled thereafter are usually limited to post-offer 
court costs (e.g., docket and printing fees15), which, in most cases, are 
trivial, thereby diminishing the rules’ potency.16  As a result, plaintiff 
and defense attorneys have reported these rules had little effect on 
how they approached their cases.17  Civil defendants who made 
unbeaten Rule 68 offers have argued that plaintiffs in cases under fee-
shifting statutes should be liable for post-offer defense attorneys’ fees, 
but federal courts have mostly declined to award such fees absent an 
express federal statutory provision18 or a specific state procedural 
rule.19  At the same time, critics of the rule argue that including 
attorneys’ fees would raise statutory scope-of-authority20 or normative 
concerns.21 Despite proposals for reform amidst public 
dissatisfaction,22 Rule 68 has not been significantly changed since its 
enactment.  To contrast, we analyze New Jersey’s offer-of-judgment 
rule.  New Jersey is among the minority of states that allow both the 
 
 15. See FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d)(1) (setting forth the scope of court costs). 
 16. See Bruce P. Merenstein, More Proposals to Amend Rule 68: Time to Sink the Ship Once 
and for All, 184 F.R.D. 145, 149 (1999) (noting that “the ‘costs’ covered by Rule 68 are those 
usually recoverable by a prevailing party under [Fed. R. Civ. P.] 54(d)”). 
 17. See Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the 
United States, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 102 F.R.D. 407, 433 (1984) (commenting that Rule 68 is seldom used). 
 18. See Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 8 (1985) (requiring the express provision for attorneys’ 
fees in the federal statute for federal question cases); see also Le v. Univ. of Penn., 321 F.3d 403, 
411 (3d Cir. 2003) (disallowing plaintiff’s post-offer attorneys’ fees); EEOC v. Bailey Ford, Inc., 
26 F.3d 570, 571 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that the defendant could not recover attorneys’ fees 
under Rule 68 absent a determination that the action was “frivolous, unreasonable, or without 
foundation”); O’Brien v. City of Greers Ferry, 873 F.2d 1115, 1120 (8th Cir. 1989) (disallowing 
attorneys’ fees under Rule 68); Crossman v. Marcoccio, 806 F.2d 329, 334 (1st Cir. 1986) 
(disallowing attorneys’ fees under Rule 68 for any prevailing party). 
 19. See, e.g., Parkes v. Hall, 906 F.2d 658, 660 (11th Cir. 1990) (stating that for diversity 
cases, applicable state law may provide for attorneys’ fees or other items to be taxed as costs). 
 20. See, e.g., Merenstein, supra note 16, at 155 (arguing that including attorneys’ fees would 
violate the Rules Enabling Act). 
 21. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984) (contending 
that “settlement is a capitulation to the conditions of mass society and should be neither 
encouraged nor praised”). 
 22. See, e.g., William W. Schwarzer, Fee-Shifting Offers of Judgment—An Approach to 
Reducing the Cost of Litigation, 76 JUDICATURE 147, 150 (1992) (Article III judge advocating 
reforms to Rule 68); see also JOHN E. SHAPARD, LIKELY CONSEQUENCES OF AMENDMENTS TO 
RULE 68, FEDERAL RULES OF PROCEDURE 2 (1995) (advocating changes to Rule 68 to increase 
judicial efficiency). 
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plaintiff and the defendant to make pre-trial offers to settle,23 but it is 
distinctive in its categorical imposition of uncapped attorneys’ fees as 
a cost-shifting measure. 
We examine a New Jersey rule of civil procedure—New Jersey 
Court Rule 4:58 (“Rule 4:58”)—that was first adopted in 1971 and 
revised in 1994.  The prior version of the rule differed from Rule 68 in 
that it allowed either litigant to issue a pre-trial settlement offer, but 
mirrored the federal rule in that it had a weak cost-shifting 
mechanism—a $750 cap on attorneys’ fees.  The revised rule abolished 
the cap outright.  By allowing for substantial cost-shifting, the revised 
rule provides a more credible inducement for litigants to settle. 
Second, we offer what we believe is the first study of offer-of-
judgment rules that is based on actual litigation data.  Any 
comprehensive understanding of the rule’s effects must include study 
of settlements as well as trials, since most civil litigation resolves 
through settlement.  Settlement terms, however, are typically not 
publicly available.24  In this study, we address this problem by using 
data from a large national insurer.  This data includes the universe of 
suits defended by the insurer, irrespective of how the suit was 
resolved (i.e., settlement or trial). 
Our results reveal that while the relative average damage 
award in New Jersey did not undergo any statistically significant 
change after the rule was revised, suits in that state took less time to 
resolve by an average of 2.3 months, or roughly 7 percent.  This 
reduction in litigation duration affected all quartiles of damage 
awards, with a statistically robust effect on all but the highest 
quartile.  Correspondingly, shorter litigation periods translated into a 
decrease in the insurers’ attorneys’ fees by an average of nearly 
$1,200, or approximately 20 percent.  These findings suggest that 
allowing a substantial cost-shifting mechanism would be an effective 
means of increasing the efficacy of offer-of-judgment rules.  
The format of the Article is as follows.  In Part II, we discuss 
the offer-of-judgment rules relative to the competing paradigms of the 
American Rule and English Rule.  We briefly describe Rule 4:58 in 
Part III: as initially enacted in 1971, the circumstances that led to its 
revision, and the 1994 revision.  In Part IV, we discuss the individual-
level data as provided by the insurer.  We outline the variables within 
 
 23. Twelve states – Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, North Dakota, and Wisconsin – allow bilateral offers. See 
Solimine & Pacheco, supra note 10, at 78-81, app. A. 
 24. Some organizations collect information on jury verdicts and settlements, which is 
available to the public (typically for a fee). Because these data are drawn from a non-random 
sample of litigation, however, they are vulnerable to selection bias. 
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the data, describe how we define the periods of interest, and explain 
our econometric approach as a means for testing the effect of the 
revised rule while controlling for secular trends.  We report our results 
in Part V and our interpretation of the results in light of the existing 
scholarship on offer-of-judgment rules.  Part VI offers implications of 
these results.  Part VII concludes and presents our proposal for future 
research. 
II. COMPARISON OF FEE-SHIFTING RULES 
Robert H. Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser first articulated the 
idea, which is generally accepted among economists and legal 
scholars, that litigants “bargain[ ] in the shadow of the law.”25  That is 
to say, litigants’ settlement negotiations are guided by what they 
believe will happen should the case be resolved by trial.  Each side will 
agree to settle only if it believes the terms of settlement are at least as 
favorable as its anticipated net outcome at trial.  Otherwise, the 
parties will remain in litigation. 
At common law, the determination of who pays legal fees in 
cases that are resolved in trial is typically adjudicated in one of two 
ways.26  The first, known as the English Rule, or Loser Pays rule, 
requires the litigant who loses at trial to pay at least a significant 
portion of the winner’s reasonable costs and attorneys’ fees.  England 
and most European countries follow this rule.  The implications of the 
English Rule’s cost-shifting have attracted considerable attention 
among legal scholars.  There is general consensus that the rule dilutes 
the value of low-probability-of-prevailing cases while enhancing the 
value of high-probability-of-prevailing cases.27  The broader 
implications of the rule are less clear.  Proponents of the rule contend 
that it deters frivolous litigation by effectively raising the cost of 
 
 25. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The 
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 950 (1979). But see William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and 
Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2548 (2004) (arguing that in 
criminal cases, litigants do not bargain in the shadow of the law). 
 26. For civil rights cases, there exists a third possibility: Prevailing plaintiffs are usually 
entitled to all of their reasonable fees; prevailing defendants usually are not entitled to any of 
their fees. Civil Rights Act of 1968, § 813(c)(2), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 3613(c)(2) (West 2001); 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, § 505, 42 U.S.C.A. § 12205 (West 2001). 
 27. See, e.g., Avery Katz, The Effect of Frivolous Lawsuits on the Settlement of Litigation, 10 
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 3, 17 (1990) (noting that many scholars believe that the English Rule 
would decrease the number of frivolous suits); Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement and Trial: A 
Theoretical Analysis under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEG. STUD. 
55, 59 (1982) (noting that the fee-shifting aspect of the rule increases the expected return for 
plaintiffs with high probability-of-prevailing cases). 
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bringing suit;28 its detractors contend that this phenomenon also 
deters meritorious litigation, particularly by litigants with limited 
resources.29  For suits that are filed, some scholars contend that the 
rule decreases the likelihood of settlement by encouraging parties to 
invest in litigation costs,30 while others conclude that the rule can 
actually promote settlement, particularly among risk-averse 
litigants.31 
The other method of resolving legal expenses is commonly 
referred to as the American Rule, which, in contrast to the English 
Rule, requires that litigants pay their own attorneys’ fees, irrespective 
of the outcome at trial.  The United States, which initially followed the 
English Rule, switched to the American Rule in the early nineteenth 
century,32 and it remains the rule in federal and state courts, limited 
only by bad-faith, contractual, and statutory exceptions.  The absence 
of fee-shifting in the American Rule avoids the English Rule’s 
potential chilling effect on meritorious litigation, but commentators on 
the rule contend that it encourages frivolous litigation.33 
 
 28. See, e.g., James W. Hughes & Edward A. Snyder, Litigation and Settlement Under the 
English and American Rules: Theory and Evidence, 38 J.L. & ECON. 225, 229 (1995) (“[T]he 
English rule discourages plaintiffs with low-quality claims, as such plaintiffs will face higher 
expected legal costs than they do under the American rule.”); James W. Hughes & Edward A. 
Snyder, The English Rule for Allocating Legal Costs: Evidence Confronts Theory, 6 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 345, 349 (1990) (“[T]he English rule discourages nuisance suits. . . .”). 
 29. See David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Model in which Suits are Brought for their 
Nuisance Value, 5 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 3, 10 (1985) (arguing that the English Rule would 
decrease both frivolous and meritorious litigation); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to 
Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEG.  STUD. 399, 428 (1973) (highlighting the 
costs that would be associated with an exceedingly high settlement rate). 
 30. See Avery Katz, Measuring the Demand for Litigation: Is the English Rule Really 
Cheaper?, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 143, 144 (1987) (describing how the rule promotes litigants to 
spend more on attorneys’ fees: the rationale is that, holding the adversary’s legal expenditures 
constant, a litigant’s marginal increase in attorneys’ fees is partially externalized onto the 
adversary, whose chances of losing at trial marginally increase); Shavell, Suit, Settlement and 
Trial, supra note 27, at 64 (stating that under an asymmetric information model, the English 
Rule introduces an additional factor of uncertainty over litigation costs as well as outcome at 
trial). 
 31. See Don L. Coursey & Linda R. Stanley, Pretrial Bargaining Behavior Within the 
Shadow of the Law: Theory and Experimental Evidence, 8 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 161, 164 (1988) 
(noting that under the British system trial is less attractive to risk averse litigants, thus 
settlement is more likely). 
 32. See  John Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the American Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery, 
47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 10 (Winter 1984) (describing how the American Rule took form in 
the aftermath of the Revolutionary War as governments stopped imposing price controls on 
attorneys’ fees). 
 33. See Richard W. Painter, Litigating on a Contingency: A Monopoly of Champions or a 
Market for Champerty?, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 625, 694-95 (1995) (noting that the threat of high 
attorneys’ fees may encourage prospective plaintiffs to file suits merely to coerce a settlement 
payoff). See generally Herbert M. Kritzer, Lawyer Fees and Lawyer Behavior in Litigation: What 
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Federal Rule 68, invoked at the option of the defendant, serves 
as a hybrid of the English and American rules.  When the defendant 
invokes the rule by making a pre-trial offer to the plaintiff, who rejects 
it only to do no better in the end, it resembles the English Rule by 
imposing a cost-shifting measure, albeit one of smaller magnitude 
than awarding attorneys’ fees.  The key distinction is that only the 
defendant can make the offer and only the plaintiff can be assessed 
post-offer costs.  Conversely, Rule 68 approximates the American Rule 
when the plaintiff rejects an offer but fares better at trial, resulting in 
each side paying its own attorneys’ fees and the plaintiff usually being 
entitled to all reasonable non-fee costs. 
Not surprisingly, given its predominance, Rule 68 has been the 
focus of most scholarship on offer-of-judgment rules.  Because of its 
unilateral design, the rule redistributes wealth from the plaintiff to 
the defendant relative to the American Rule.  Rule 68, if invoked, 
imposes risk onto the plaintiff without any corresponding risk borne 
by the defendant.  The defendant can exploit this inequity in the 
settlement process, compelling a lower settlement than under the 
American Rule.34  Scholars contend that the effect on the likelihood of 
settlement depends on what the litigants are contesting.  If the 
litigants agree on damages but not on liability, the rule discourages 
settlement; conversely, if the litigants agree on liability but not 
damages, the rule encourages settlement.35  According to 
practitioners, however, these distinctions are more theoretical than 
real, since litigants view court costs as an inconsequential part of legal 
costs.36  If true, the impact of cost-shifting dissipates and the 
 
Does the Empirical Literature Really Say?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1943 (2002) (reviewing the empirical 
literature that demonstrates the impact of legal fees on both lawyers and clients). 
 34. See Geoffrey P. Miller, An Economic Analysis of Rule 68, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 93, 108 
(1986) (noting that Rule 68 redistributes wealth from plaintiffs to defendants); George L. Priest, 
Regulating the Content and Volume of Litigation: An Economic Analysis, 1 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 
163, 170-71 (1982) (noting that defendants will provide lower settlement offers under the English 
Rule). 
 35. Kathy Spier, Pretrial Bargaining the Design of Fee-Shifting Rules, 25 RAND J. ECON. 
197, 202 (1994). But see Amy Farmer & Paul Pecorino, Conditional Cost Shifting and the 
Incidence of Trial: Pretrial Bargaining in the Face of a Rule 68 Offer, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 318, 
334 (2000) (arguing that when the level of damages is unknown and random, Rule 68 does not 
discourage settlement). 
 36. See Solimine & Pacheco, supra note 10, at 56 (“Because Federal Rule 68 has not been 
widely utilized by practitioners, the overwhelming majority of the commentary and the Federal 
Rules Advisory Committee have determined that Federal Rule 68 has not been effective in 
achieving its intended purpose.”). For other articles citing the infrequent use of Rule 68, see 
David A. Anderson, Improving Settlement Devices: Rule 68 and Beyond, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 225, 
226 (1994) (stating that Federal Rule 68 requires that defendants collect post-offer court costs 
from the plaintiff if a refused offer is not improved upon at trial, and noting that “[i]n this form, 
Rule 68 offers have been underused and ineffective”); Keith N. Hylton, Rule 68, The Modified 
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negotiation environment under a Rule 68 regime reverts to that of the 
American Rule. 
The bilateral offer-of-judgment rule is similar to the English 
Rule in that it allows for double-sided fee-shifting, eliminating the 
inherent bargaining advantage the defendant enjoys under Rule 68.37  
But this rule is more nuanced: because the cost-shifting mechanism is 
triggered not by who prevails at trial but by whether the litigant who 
rejects an offer fares worse at trial, the litigants are never punished 
solely for “losing” at trial.  This affects the pre-trial negotiation 
process.  Whereas a plaintiff with a strong probability of prevailing at 
trial enjoys a strong bargaining position under the English Rule, 
under the bilateral rule, her position is weakened somewhat, since the 
defendant can concede liability and still make a settlement offer that 
imposes cost-shifting at trial.  The degree to which the rule influences 
litigation depends on the magnitude of the cost-shifting provision.  
The higher the cost-shifting, relative to the amount in controversy, the 
greater is the rule’s potential effect. 
III. BILATERAL OFFER-OF-JUDGMENT IN NEW JERSEY: ADDING TEETH 
TO AN ESTABLISHED RULE 
Whereas most states simply modeled their offer-of-judgment 
rule on federal Rule 68, New Jersey took a different approach.  From 
its inception in 1971, New Jersey’s rule was more ambitious in scope.  
First, the rule allowed the plaintiff as well as the defendant to make 
pre-trial settlement offers.38  Second, the cost-shifting measure went 
beyond court costs to include attorneys’ fees.39  Proponents of the law 
 
British Rule, and Civil Litigation Reform, 1 MICH. L. & POL’Y REV. 73, 76 (1996) (stating that 
Rule 68 is “seldom used by attorneys”); Roy D. Simon, Jr., The Riddle of Rule 68, 54 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1985) (arguing that “two principal defects” have “crippled” Rule 68’s effectiveness; 
namely, that Rule 68 is only available to defendants and that the sanction of post-offer costs is 
typically too minimal to motivate parties to settle); Roy D. Simon Jr., Rule 68 at the Crossroads: 
The Relationship between Offers of Judgment and Statutory Attorneys Fees, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 
889, 891 (1984) (“Rule 68 is seldom used and is widely considered a failure.”). 
 37. See Miller, supra note 34, at 124 (“[A] mutual offer of judgment rule would not be 
subject to the troubling redistributive effects of [Rule 68].”). 
 38. The only requirement was that the offeror file the offer with the clerk of the court at 
least three weeks before the scheduled court date. To agree to an offer, the offeree also had to file 
its acceptance with the clerk of the court no later than ten days prior to trial. See N.J. CT. R. 
4:58-1 (2005). The court treated any failure to respond to an offer in a timely matter as a 
rejection, but both parties were free to submit more than one offer. See id. Submitting an 
additional offer, however, constituted a withdrawal of all previous offers made by that party. See 
id. 
 39. A set of examples is instructive. Case A – offeree not liable for cost-shifting sanction: P 
offers D $1000 to settle; D rejects. At trial, P wins $900. P is entitled to the damage award, but D 
need not pay any additional cost-shifting since the trial award was more favorable (to D) than 
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believed that, in addition to encouraging parties to settle, this rule 
would deter frivolous or bad-faith claims.40  The law applied to all civil 
cases except matrimonial matters.41 Undercutting these 
enhancements to the federal rule, however, were two key 
qualifications.  First, cost-shifting would be triggered only if the trial 
outcome was more than 20 percent less favorable (from the 
perspective of the offeree) than the rejected pre-trial offer.42  This 
provided a margin of error for the offeree when assessing any pre-trial 
offer.  Second, and perhaps more significant, attorneys’ fees were 
capped at $750, with no provision to adjust the cap for inflation.  Thus, 
the cap continued to decline in real dollars over time.43 
In the aftermath of the rule’s adoption, grumblings within the 
New Jersey Bar persisted, mostly on the grounds that the rule was 
ineffective at promoting settlement.  In the spring of 1994, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court appointed the State Bar’s Civil Courts Task 
Force to evaluate the rule.  The task force recommended a stronger 
offer-of-judgment rule, a sentiment echoed by the state’s high court.  
The matter was subsequently referred to the Supreme Court 
Committee on Civil Practice for incorporation into the rules in the 
summer of 1994.  Specifically, the Committee suggested the rule 
would be strengthened best by eliminating the cap on attorneys’ fees 
when imposing sanctions.44 The New Jersey Supreme Court adopted 
the Committee’s recommendation, but left in place the 20 percent 
buffer on cost and fee-shifting.45  The revised rule went into effect on 
September 1, 1994. 
 
the pre-trial offer. Case B – offeree is liable for cost-shifting: D offers P $800 to settle; P rejects. 
At trial, P is awarded $500. D must pay the $500, but D can deduct any costs pursuant to the 
rule because his pre-trial offer was more favorable (to P) than what P actually received at trial. 
 40. See Sylvia B. Pressler, Commentary, N.J. Ct. R. 4:42-9 in RULES GOVERNING THE 
COURTS OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY 998 (2005). 
 41. N.J. CT. R. 4:58-1 (2005). 
 42. Another set of examples is instructive. Case C – offeree liable for attorneys’ fees: P 
offers D $1000 to settle; D rejects. At trial, P wins $1500. D must pay P the $1500 damage award 
as well as attorneys’ fees, since the resulting damage award exceeded the pre-trial offer by more 
than 20 percent. Case D – offeree not liable for attorneys’ fees: D offers P $800 to settle; P rejects. 
At trial, D is found liable for $700. D must pay the $700, but P is not liable for attorneys’ fees, 
since the pre-trial offer did not exceed the damage award by more than 20 percent. 
 43. For example, in 1971, the $750 cap was equivalent to approximately $3500 in 2004 
dollars. 
 44. See 1994 Report of the Supreme Court Committee on Civil Practice, 136 N.J. L.J. 581, 
589 (Feb. 14, 1994). It is worth noting that the “legislative” history behind the revised rule was 
terse, with the committee simply noting that it believed eliminating the cap on attorneys’ fees 
would strengthen the rule. 
 45. All attorneys’ fees, however, are subject to a judge’s determination that they are 
reasonable. See N.J. CT. R. 4:58-2 (2005) (Consequences of Non-acceptance of Claimant’s Offer); 
N.J. CT. R. 4:58-3 (2005) (Consequences of Non-acceptance of Offer of Party Not a Claimant). 
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IV. DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
A. Description of Data 
As a condition on using its data, the insurance company 
required that we preserve its anonymity.  Accordingly, throughout the 
Article, we refer to the company as Insurer X.  We can, however, 
provide some general information about the company.  Insurer X is 
one of the largest investment and insurance companies in the United 
States, with a strong presence in the Northeast.  Insurer X insures 
both businesses and individuals. It granted us its data on individuals 
for this study.  Although it provides an array of insurance services for 
individuals, the overwhelming percentage of its suits falls under 
automobile and property insurance claims. 
The dataset contains suits filed by individuals against Insurer 
X.  “Suits” in this instance does not refer to routine insurance claims 
submitted to the insurer, which are handled administratively.46  
Rather, the suits in this dataset were claims that did not resolve 
through administrative means and resulted in litigation.  In each case, 
the plaintiffs were non-policyholders suing for injuries allegedly 
caused by policyholders of Insurer X. 
We examined individual insurance suits filed against Insurer X 
between January 1, 1992 and April 30, 1997.  An overwhelming 
percentage of suits in the database come from the liability coverage 
offered as part of automobile and homeowners insurance policies.  As 
the law was revised effective September 1, 1994, the selected time 
window allowed us to observe 2.67 years each in the pre- and post-
amendment periods.  The records of each suit filed during the period 
are included in each dataset, irrespective of outcome (e.g., whether the 
suit settled, was dismissed, proceeded to trial, or deemed time-barred).  
Over 99 percent of suits filed during this time resolved by July 31, 
2004.  To ensure against potential time bias from including extremely 
long-running cases filed early in the period, however, we limited the 
dataset to suits that resolved within 7.25 years.47  Even with this 
 
 46. For example, a policyholder who damages his vehicle submits his claim to the insurance 
company, which typically reimburses him – minus the deductible. 
 47. For example, all suits filed in 1992 would be included in the dataset if completed within 
roughly twelve years, while for suits filed in 1997, only those completed within roughly seven 
years would be included. Given a positive correlation between duration of litigation and the size 
of the damage award, we chose 7.25 years because it represents the maximum amount of time 
between the last claims filing date – April 30, 1997 – and the last recording date of the data – 
July 31, 2004. 
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limitation, over 97 percent of suits filed during this period resolved 
within this moving window. 
 
Figure 1 
Geographical Map of Treatment and Control States 
 
 
 
As illustrated in Figure 1, Insurer X provided data from six 
states: New Jersey, Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, New York, and 
Pennsylvania.  We selected the other states to serve as a suitable 
control group for two reasons.  Most important, the other states did 
not enact any significant changes in their offer-of-settlement or other 
apparently relevant legal rules between 1992 and 1997.  Also, we 
decided to define widely the states composing the control group, since 
no single state, in the Northeast or elsewhere in the United States, 
mirrors New Jersey – a geographically small but very densely 
populated state with a high number of registered drivers and property 
owners.  Accordingly, the surrounding states, in the aggregate, better 
approximate the demographic profile of New Jersey. 
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Table 1 provides statistics on the United States and each of the 
states in the study, taken from the U.S. Census.  As the table 
illustrates, New Jersey differs from the other states on some of the 
baseline statistics.  For most variables, the trend between 1990 and 
2000 in New Jersey follows that of other states, with New Jersey 
situated in the middle of the distribution of the control states. 
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Table 1 
General Demographic Statistics for Treatment and Control States 
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Table 2 provides summary statistics comparing New Jersey 
and the states comprising the control group.  For cases filed between 
1992 and 1997, Insurer X resolved 41,545 suits.  Of that total, New 
Jersey accounted for 8,062 suits, and the five control states included 
33,483 suits.  For each suit, Insurer X provided the following 
information: a unique identifier for each suit, the state where the suit 
was filed, the exact date the suit was filed, the type of insurance suit, 
the exact date the suit was resolved, how much Insurer X paid (if 
anything) to the plaintiff, and the attorneys’ fees Insurer X paid to 
defend the suit. 
 
Table 2 
All Closed Insurance Suits in Treatment and Control States 
Claims Filed between 1992 and 1997 
Entire Sample New Jersey Surrounding States
(Treatment Group) (Control Group)
(1) (2) (3)
Total Observations 45,998 8,062 37,157
Percentage of cases where 71% 70% 71%
     damage payment exceeds zero
Mean damage payment (all cases) $31,391 $25,792 $32,509
($117,385) ($79,397) ($123,952)
Mean damage payment where $43,882 $36,601 $45,614
     damage payment exceeds zero ($138,188) ($92,470) ($146,935)
Mean duration of litigation (years) 2.79 2.79 2.80
(1.58) (1.51) (1.60)
Mean attorneys' fees (paid by $6,548 $5,058 $6,904
     Insurer X for own attorney) ($34,317) ($37,762)
Note : Data provided by Insurer X, for all closed claims of duration not exceeding 7.25 years filed between January 1, 1992 and 
December 31, 1996.  Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, New York, and Pennsylvania comprise the control group.  Standard 
deviations are in parentheses.  All payout figures are in 2003 dollars, adjusted by the Consumer Price Index (CPI).  
It is worth noting the limitations of our data.  First, the data 
does not report whether the parties formally submitted any offers 
pursuant to Rule 4:58, or whether the offeree accepted or rejected any 
such offers, or whether the offeree who rejected the offer subsequently 
fared worse at trial.  The dataset does include a variable reporting 
how each suit resolved, but it is coded only for 75.8 percent of the total 
observations.  We use this variable with caution, although we note 
that this response rate was consistent across the states and over time.  
While we would have preferred this inclusion on offers and a complete 
coding of how suits resolved, we believe that even if available, this 
information would not provide a complete measure of the true effect of 
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the law.  If parties indeed bargain in the shadow of the law,48 then it 
logically follows that the law has an effect not merely before trial but 
before the rule is formally invoked.  Litigants will account for the 
change in the law in their pre-trial negotiations even if they do not 
make a formal offer.  Accordingly, that is why we analyze the full set 
of suits. 
Second, because the data is provided by an insurer, we possess 
limited information about the plaintiff.  While we know the duration 
of litigation and how much in damages, if any, the plaintiff received, 
we do not know how much the plaintiff paid in attorneys’ fees, nor the 
conditions under which she received legal representation (e.g., hourly 
rate, contingency).  The rule, while symmetric, may have an 
asymmetric effect on plaintiffs if they possess different levels of risk 
than that of the insurer.  Unfortunately, a definitive answer to this 
question is beyond the scope of the data. 
Table 3 summarizes the statutory regimes of the various states 
between 1992 and 1997.  Three of the states—Delaware, New York, 
and Pennsylvania—expressly followed the federal rule.  Connecticut 
allowed bilateral offers and attorneys’ fees, but the latter were capped 
at $350.  Maryland did not have any offer-of-judgment rule at all.  For 
New Jersey, its old Rule 4:58 was effectively the same as the 
Connecticut rule, the only difference being a slightly higher cap on 
attorneys’ fees, neither of which were particularly significant by the 
1990s.49  Thus, before September 1994, New Jersey and the other 
states shared the common feature of failing to provide a powerful 
offer-of-judgment rule. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 48. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 25, at 951 (examining “how the rules and 
procedures used in court for adjudicating disputes affect the bargaining process that occurs 
between divorcing couples outside the courtroom”) (emphasis in original). 
 49. Connecticut’s offer-of-judgment rule allows for an award of prejudgment interest if, 
having made an offer rejected by the defendant, the plaintiff receives a verdict at least as large 
as her offer. In that event, the plaintiff is entitled to the judgment plus 12% pre-judgment 
interest. If the action commenced before October 1, 1981, or the offer of judgment was filed later 
than eighteen months after the complaint was filed, interest is computed from the date the offer 
was filed. If the action commenced on October 1, 1981 or later and the offer was filed no later 
than eighteen months from the date of the complaint’s filing, the interest is computed from the 
date the complaint was filed. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-192a(b) (West Supp. 2005). 
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Table 3 
All Closed Insurance Suits in Treatment and Control States between 1992 and 1997 
 
State Statute or Rule Description
New Jersey N.J. Ct. R. 4:58 Offer: bilateral
Sanction: court costs, attorneys' fees*
Connecticut Ct. G.S.A. § 52-19 Offer: bilateral
Sanction: court costs
                attorneys' fees capped at $350
Delaware Del. Super. Ct. R. 68 Follows F.R.C.P. 68
Maryland No provision
New York N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3221 Follows F.R.C.P. 68
Pennsylvania Pa. R. Civ. P. 238 Follows F.R.C.P. 68
* Note: Attorneys' fees changed in 1994 from a $750 cap to include all reasonable fees.  
 
Table 4 summarizes the change in New Jersey on September 1, 
1994, following the revision of the rule.50  Since this time, New Jersey 
has maintained the rule to allow bilateral offers and attorneys’ fees.  
The other states did not enact any corresponding change.  It is this 
contrast that this Article seeks to evaluate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 50. The full text of the statute is included in Appendix B. 
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Table 4 
N.J. Ct. R. 4:58 (Original and Revised) 
 
 
Period 1: January 1, 1992 - August 31, 1994 Period 2: September 1, 1994 - April 30, 1997
1. Offer (4:58-1) 1. Offer (4:58-1)
Bilateral: Either the plaintiff or the defendant 
can issue an offer up to 20 days before the 
start of trial
Same
2. Consequences of rejecting Offer 2. Consequences of Rejecting Offer
a. Plaintiff rejects Defendant's offer (4:58-2) a. Plaintiff rejects defendant's offer (4:58-2)
1. Fares better at trial: rule has no 
consequence
1. Same
2. If damage award less than 80% of 
defendant's offer: pays i) court costs; and ii) 
defendant's attorneys' fees (capped at $750)
2. Same, but no cap on attorneys' fees
b. Defendant rejects plaintiff's offer (4:58-3) b. Defendant rejects plaintiff's offer (4:58-3)
1. Fares better at trial: rule has no 
consequence
1. Same
2. If damage award more than 120% of 
plaintiff's offer: pay i) court costs; ii) 8% 
interest on award; and  iii) plaintiff's attorneys' 
fees (capped at $750)
2. Same, but no cap on attorneys' fees
 
 
B. Econometric Approach 
We analyzed the panel data using a difference-in-difference 
model.51  In a social science framework, this model measures the effect 
of a given policy or rule when it is imposed on one group (treatment) 
but not on the other group (control).  In so doing, the model constructs 
a natural experiment where, whenever possible, the treatment and 
control groups are identical with respect to other observable 
characteristics.  In quasi-experimental research, however, finding 
identical comparison groups is often elusive, so one strives for 
 
 51. See Albert Yoon, Damage Caps and Civil Litigation: An Empirical Study of Medical 
Malpractice Litigation in the South, 3 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 199 (2001) (using a difference-in-
difference model to analyze the effect damage caps have had on plaintiff recovery in medical 
malpractice litigation); David Card & Alan B. Krueger, Minimum Wages and Employment: A 
Case Study of the Fast-Food Industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 772 
(1994) (analyzing the effect of increased minimum wage in New Jersey by comparing surveys of 
fast food restaurants in New Jersey and eastern Pennsylvania before and after the increase); 
Jonathan Gruber, The Incidence of Mandated Maternity Benefits, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 622 (1994) 
(using the Current Population Survey to examine the impact of state and federal laws mandating 
comprehensive coverage for childbirth in health insurance policies); David Card, The Impact of 
the Mariel Boatlift on the Miami Labor Market, 43 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 245 (1990) (relying 
on the Current Population Survey from 1979-85 to examine changes in the Miami labor market 
resulting from the influx of Cuban immigrants produced by the Mariel Boatlift); Orley 
Ashenfelter, Estimating the Effect of Training Programs on Earnings, 60 REV. ECON. & STAT. 47 
(1978) (attempting to solve the problems encountered when evaluating the effect of governmental 
post-schooling training programs on earnings by employing a data system that matches a 
trainee’s program records with her Social Security earnings history). 
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similarities between the two groups.  More important, the driving 
assumption of a difference-in-difference approach is that, in the 
absence of the phenomenon, the observable trends in the treatment 
group would have remained the same as the control group. 
Ideally, the phenomenon one wants to evaluate is an exogenous 
event, uninfluenced by the circumstances within the particular 
groups.  Unlike a truly randomized experiment, the evaluation of any 
enacted rule always raises questions of endogeneity, because it is a 
product of a deliberative process.52  One can argue, however, that the 
revision of Rule 4:58 is an exogenous event: the rule change came 
about through judicial, not legislative means.  While state supreme 
court justices are certainly not impervious to political pressures, they 
are certainly more independent than legislators, all the more so in 
New Jersey because of their terms of tenure as set forth in the state 
constitution.53  While it is impossible to construct a true natural 
experiment in social science, the rule revision closely approximates 
this. 
The treatment group comprises New Jersey litigants involved 
in suits defended by Insurer X under individual insurance policies, 
before and after Rule 4:58 was modified.  The large majority of suits 
are by non-policyholders who sued Insurer X for allegedly tortious 
conduct by a policyholder; in a minority of cases, an Insurer X 
 
 52. In more formal terms, the concern here is with endogenous sample selection, where the 
independent variable of interest is related to the dependent variable, either directly or through 
the error term.  In this event, the concern is that the observed changes in the outcome variable 
are attributable not to the aforementioned independent variable, but rather some unobserved 
difference between the treatment and control groups. 
 53. In addition, the institutional design within New Jersey allows state supreme court 
justices greater independence than any other state. These justices are appointed by the Governor 
and confirmed by the State Senate for an initial term of seven years. N.J. CONST. art. VI, § VI. 
On reappointment, they are granted tenure until they reach the mandatory judicial retirement 
age of 70. Id. 
 An illustration of the New Jersey Supreme Court’s judicial autonomy is the series of 
decisions commonly known as the Mount Laurel Trilogy, in which the court repeatedly held that 
municipalities have a state constitutional duty to provide a realistic opportunity for affordable 
housing, notwithstanding the strong opposition of the New Jersey legislature and the public. See 
S. Burlington County NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel I), 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 
1975) (holding a zoning ordinance that intentionally prohibited moderate and low income 
housing from an area invalid because it violated the state constitutional requirement that land 
use regulations promote the general welfare); Burlington County NAACP v. Twp. of Mount 
Laurel (Mount Laurel II), 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983) (revisiting and clarifying Mount Laurel I 
after both the Mount Laurel community and many others failed to comply with the court’s 
mandate to provide a realistic opportunity for affordable housing); Bi-County Dev. of Clinton, 
Inc. v. Borough of High Bridge, 805 A.2d 433, 434 (N.J. 2002) (holding that paying a development 
fee instead of constructing affordable housing as allowed under Mount Laurel II “does not justify 
disturbing the general rule that a municipality is not obligated to provide access to its sewer 
system to residents of a neighboring municipality”). 
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policyholder sued Insurer X.  The control group comprises similarly-
situated litigants in Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, New York, and 
Pennsylvania.  We measured outcomes at the individual level (i), and 
the data varies across states (s) and year (t). We looked at the effect of 
Rule 4:58 on the amount that plaintiffs recover, the time it took to 
resolve the suit, and the amount that Insurer X paid in attorneys’ fees 
to defend the suit. 
As its description suggests, a difference-in-difference model 
measures the difference in the given variable of interest before and 
after the change in Rule 4:58, minus the difference in the same 
variable in the control group for the corresponding time.  If pgo  is the 
outcome for plaintiffs in group g (New Jersey, control states) and 
period p (prior version of Rule 4:58; revised version of Rule 4:58), then 
the raw difference-in-difference estimator is given by 
)()( precontrol
post
control
pre
NJ
post
NJ oooo −−− . 
However, because the raw estimator does not account for other 
factors that may affect the variables of interest (e.g., the type of suit), 
we report the regression-adjusted difference-in-difference, in which we 
assume that the amount the plaintiff receives in damages is a function 
of individual-specific and state-wide factors, 
Oist= α + βXist + γNJ + δ∗ Period 2 + φ(NJ) *(Period 2)+ ε 
where Oist is the outcome measure.  In this model, we looked at three 
outcome measures: damage award (how much plaintiff received from 
Insurer X in damages), attorneys’ fees (fees that Insurer X paid to 
defend the suit), and the duration of litigation.  All dollar figures are 
in 2003 constant dollars, as established by the Consumer Price Index.  
The duration statistics are reported in months, unless otherwise 
stated.  The y-intercept is measured by α.  Xist represents a series of 
dummies for the underlying basis of the insurance suit (e.g., 
subcategories for auto, property, general, and miscellaneous types of 
insurance).  NJ is an indicator variable for whether or not the plaintiff 
filed the suit in New Jersey.  PERIOD 2 represents an indicator 
variable for whether or not the case was filed after the September 1, 
1994 modification of Rule 4:58.  The variable of interest – (NJ) (PERIOD 
2) – is an interaction term of the two indicator variables.  Accordingly, 
the coefficient on the interaction term is the regression-adjusted 
difference-in-difference estimator for each legal regime.  The error 
term is captured by ε. 
Because the point estimates for the coefficients are similar 
under the raw estimate or the regression-adjusted difference-in-
difference, we report the latter in the text, and include the former in 
Appendix A. 
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V. RESULTS 
Figures 2 through 4 track the trends in damage awards, 
attorney expenses, and duration of litigation before and after the 
modification in Rule 4:58.  Years are divided into three equal parts, 
and the figures report a three-period moving average to adjust for 
outliers in any given period.  The figures show general trends across 
time, which vary depending on the outcome variable and the group.  
The variations one observes within and across groups reflect in part 
the effect of outlier claims, reflecting unusually high damage awards, 
lengthy litigation, or attorneys’ fees.54  Had these figures plotted the 
median, rather than mean amounts, the trends would have been less 
variable.  But as insurers are concerned about all suits, we elected to 
report the mean to observe—albeit indirectly—any effect of the 
revised rule on outlier suits. 
 
Figure 2 
Average Damage Payment by Insurer X 
(reported by three-period moving average) 
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 54. For example, included among the outlier suits is a damage award exceeding 
$10,000,000, and an attorneys’ fee exceeding $6,000,000. 
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Figure 3 
Average Duration of Litigation for Insurer X 
(reported by three-period moving average) 
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Figure 4 
Average Attorneys’ Fees for Insurer X 
(reported by three-period moving average) 
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Figure 2 shows that damage awards vary for both New Jersey 
and the control states, with no clear discernible pattern until 1996, 
when the trend lines begin to diverge.  By comparison, Figure 3, which 
reports the duration of litigation, shows a variable and visible 
downward trend for New Jersey but a less variable and discernible 
upward trend for the control states.  Lastly, Figure 4 shows that 
Insurer X’s attorneys’ fees appear generally stable for the control 
states, but gradually declining in New Jersey. 
The figures underscore the merits of the difference-in-
difference approach.  First, the approach highlights the importance of 
having a control group when engaging in any program evaluation.  
Trends that one may impute to the change in policy when looking only 
at the treatment group may, upon comparing them to a control group, 
simply reflect a broader secular trend.  Second, it reveals the value of 
extending the period of analysis in each direction.  Looking at the 
period immediately before and after the policy change may understate 
or overstate the policy’s effect.  Examining a broader period, and hence 
more observations, provides a more informed analysis. 
Although the preceding figures suggest that the revised Rule 
4:58 had an effect on litigation in New Jersey, it is hard to discern 
visually the magnitude of the policy change, and whether the results 
are statistically significant.  To answer these questions, we turn to the 
regression-adjusted difference-in-difference analysis, as reported in 
Table 5.55 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 55. Raw estimates of these difference-in-differences are presented in Appendix A. 
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Table 5 
Regression-Adjusted Difference-in-Difference 
Claims Filed against Insurer X between 1992 and 1997 
 
A. B. C.
Damage Awarda Duration Attorneys' Fees
of Litigation (for Insurer X)
New Jersey -$11,285*** -0.1371 -$915***
($2,660) (0.3082) ($263)
Period 2 -$8,286*** 1.2087*** -$684*
($1,668) (0.2136) ($400)
(New Jersey) x (Period 2) -$3,079 -2.3359*** -$1,173**
($3,794) (0.4498) ($537)
Control for type of insurance claimb Y Y Y
r 2 0.002 0.0411 0.0083
Mean $31,220 34.02 $5,880
N 41,545 41,545 41,545
** Significant at the 95% confidence level, two-tailed test.
*** Significant at the 99% confidence level, two-tailed test.
Notes : Data provided by Insurer X for all suits filed between January 1, 1992 and April 30, 1997.  Claims exceeding 
7.25 years are omitted.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  Control states are Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, 
New Jersey, and New York.  All payout figures are in 2003 dollars, adjusted by the Consumer Price Index.
b The regression controls for type of insurance claim through a series of 27 dummy variables, including for auto: 
collision, dismemberment, other property; property: burglary, fire, and theft.
* Significant at the 90% confidence level, two-tailed test.
a Given high percentage of zero payouts, we use a Tobit model to estimate the regression.
 
 
Consistent with Figure 2, Column A shows that between 1992 
and 1997, damage awards in New Jersey were lower than in the 
control states by an average of $6,531.  In Period 2 (after Rule 4:58 
was revised), both New Jersey and the control states experienced 
lower payouts.  The difference-in-difference estimate, (NJ) (Per 2), 
reveals that in Period 2 New Jersey’s payouts declined by $1,560 
relative to the control states.  This reduction, however, was not 
statistically significant. 
By contrast, Column B shows that the duration of litigation in 
New Jersey dropped by an average of 2.3 months in Period 2, relative 
to the control states, where duration actually increased over the same 
period.  This change reflects a 7 percent relative reduction between 
Period 1 and Period 2, a statistically significant change where the 
overall litigation duration increased by less than one month from 
Period 1 (33.7 months) to Period 2 (34.3 months). 
  
2006] OFFER-OF-JUDGMENT RULES 179 
Given that there was a sizeable but statistically non-significant 
reduction in damage awards and a sizeable and statistically 
significant reduction in duration of litigation, how did it affect Insurer 
X’s own attorneys’ fees?  Recall that Figure 4 suggests that these fees 
appear to move in slightly opposite directions in Period 2.  Column C 
reports that, controlling for types of cases, attorneys’ fees in New 
Jersey decreased by $1,173 in Period 2 relative to the control states, a 
statistically significant reduction of nearly 20 percent. 
With any analysis of panel data, there is always the possibility 
that results are being driven by outlier data.  This is particularly true 
of litigation, where a few damage awards may be an order of 
magnitude higher than the others.  Also, to the extent that the 
regression suggests that the law creates statistically significant 
change, it is helpful to see where along the distribution of a given 
outcome variable these changes are occurring.  Conversely, a 
regression reporting a statistically non-significant change may be 
masking meaningful changes that occur along different points of the 
distribution.  Accordingly, we find it instructive to examine the 
cumulative distribution functions of these outcome variables, 
comparing New Jersey to the control states before and after the 
change in the law. 
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Figure 5 
Cumulative Distribution Function Comparison of Damage Awards 
Period 1 vs. Period 2 
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Figure 5 reports the cumulative distribution function56 of 
damage awards in New Jersey and the control states in Period 1 and 
Period 2.  The awards are reported in log (base 10) to observe the 
distribution of the lower payouts that comprise the majority of 
awards.57  Figure 5 supports our inference from Figure 2, namely that 
there is not a clear difference in payouts between the two groups for 
either Period 1 or Period 2.  The distributions in each period closely 
track one another, with slight spacing occurring at awards greater 
than $10,000. 
 
 
Figure 6 
Cumulative Distribution Function Comparison of Duration of Litigation 
Period 1 vs. Period 2 
 
 
 56. The cumulative distribution function (CDF) is “a function that gives the probability of a 
random variable being less than or equal to a specified real number.” JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, 
INTRODUCTORY ECONOMETRICS: A MODERN APPROACH 793 (South-Western College Publishing 
2000). In the figures in the text, the CDF shows the successive probability—from zero to 100 
percent—for each observed value in the probability distribution. 
 57. Showing the damage awards without transformation compresses smaller awards, 
rendering it difficult to discern any distinctions across groups. 
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The distribution of suits by duration reveals more pronounced 
results, as shown in Figure 6.  In Period 1, the lines for New Jersey 
and the control states follow different trends, and actually cross one 
another.  New Jersey had a smaller percentage of short-duration suits 
(e.g., under three years), but also a smaller percentage of medium-
duration suits (e.g., between three and six years).  Beyond six years, 
the lines converge.  In Period 2, New Jersey’s distribution shifts 
slightly to the left as the control states’ distribution shifts more 
markedly to the right.  New Jersey matches the control group’s 
distribution for suits less than two years, and thereafter remains to 
the left.  Relative to the control group, New Jersey in Period 2 
distinguishes itself with a higher percentage of the suits between 
three and five years. 
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Figure 7 
Cumulative Distribution Function Comparison of Attorneys’ Fees 
Period 1 vs. Period 2 
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Lastly, the figures for attorneys’ fees follow similar trends as 
the duration distributions, albeit with more subtle differences.  Figure 
7 shows that in Period 1, New Jersey had relatively fewer suits with 
attorneys’ fees below $5,000, and relatively more suits with attorneys’ 
fees between $5,000 and $10,000.  In Period 2, the gap between New 
Jersey and the control group narrowed for smaller attorneys’ fees (e.g., 
below $5,000), although it appeared to hold constant for fees above 
$10,000. 
The question that naturally arises is what is the interaction 
between damage awards and duration of litigation?  As one might 
expect, the correlation between duration of litigation and damage 
award is positive.58  One explanation for this is that higher damage 
awards are more complex in nature, requiring parties to spend more 
time—e.g., through discovery, expert witnesses, etc.—to assess more 
accurately the merits of the suit.  Alternatively, it may be that parties 
take more time reaching an agreement when the stakes are higher.  
After Rule 4:58 was revised, the results show that suits in New Jersey 
took less time on average to resolve, but where did this reduction 
occur with respect to damage awards?  Does the reduction occur across 
the full distribution of awards, or does the revised rule appear to affect 
only one segment, such as small awards or large awards? 
To answer this question more formally, we again turn to a 
difference-in-difference model.  This time, however, we divided the 
data sample into four approximately equal-sized groups, based on the 
size of damage awards: $0; $1-$7,500; $7,501-$25,000; and $25,001 
and above.  For each of these quartiles we ran a separate difference-
in-difference analysis with the duration of litigation as our outcome 
variable.  The results are reported in Table 6. 
 
 
 58. For the overall sample, the correlation between duration of litigation and damage 
award was 0.09. Breaking down the damage awards into quartiles, the average duration 
litigation was as follows: $0: 32.7 months; $1-$7500: 31.1 months; $7501-$25,000: 34.4 months; 
$25,001 and above: 38.1 months. 
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Table 6 
Change in Duration of Litigation - Period 1 vs. Period 2 
Based on Damage Award Quartile 
Damage Award 
Quartile NJ Control States
Difference-in-
Difference Mean N
(Per1-Per2) (Per1-Per2)
$0 -5.54*** -2.37*** -3.17*** 32.66 [11988]
(0.7889) (0.4418) (0.8972)
$1-$7,500 -2.54*** 2.07*** -4.62*** 31.15 [10001]
(0.8133) (0.4361) (0.9201)
$7,501-$25,000 1.23 2.95*** -1.71* 34.39 [9314]
(0.7757) (0.4247) (0.8853)
$25,001 and up 2.20*** 2.90*** -0.70 38.07 [10242]
(0.8204) (0.4085) (0.9264)
Notes : Data provided by Insurer X for all suits filed between January 1, 1992 and April 30, 1997.  Claims exceeding 
7.25 years are omitted.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  Control states are Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, New 
Jersey, and New York.  
* Significant at the 90% confidence level, two-tailed test.
** Significant at the 95% confidence level, two-tailed test.
*** Significant at the 99% confidence level, two-tailed test.  
After Rule 4:58 was revised, the average duration of litigation 
dropped in New Jersey by roughly 5.5 months for suits where the 
insurer ultimately paid zero in damage awards and 2.5 months for 
suits where it paid between $1 and $7,500.  For the upper two 
quartiles, the duration of litigation in New Jersey actually increased: 
by approximately 1.25 months for suits between $7,501 and $25,000 
and 2.25 months for suits beyond $25,000.  The figures in the control 
states follow a similar upward trend, except that the control states 
experienced a steeper upward trend towards longer disputes.  Thus, 
when we look at the difference-in-difference estimator, New Jersey 
experienced a relative drop in duration of litigation for each quartile of 
damage awards; all but the highest quartile were statistically 
significant. 
VI. DISCUSSION 
Our results show that the revision of Rule 4:58 appears to have 
had a discernable effect on insurance-based litigation.  In the 
aftermath of the revision of the offer-of-judgment rule, which 
abolished the $750 cap on attorneys’ fees as a cost-shifting measure, 
the average duration of litigation decreased in New Jersey relative to 
the neighboring control states by 7 percent (2.3 months) on average.  
Correspondingly, the amount that Insurer X spent on its own 
attorneys’ fees in New Jersey decreased on average by a relative 
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margin of 20 percent ($1,173).  Both of these reductions were 
statistically significant.  At the same time, damage awards, which had 
a modest relative decrease in New Jersey, did not change in any 
statistically significant amount. 
It may be instructive to take a step back and ask whether our 
empirical findings comport with expectations.  We preface our 
remarks by cautioning against applying our findings as a direct test of 
existing theoretical models on offer-of-judgment rules.59  In generating 
predictions, these models make strong assumptions regarding the 
bargaining process between litigants. Once we relax the 
aforementioned theoretical assumptions, however, the analysis grows 
increasingly complex.  In actual litigation, litigants may disagree over 
who is at fault, the scope of damages, what will happen at trial, as 
well as their sense of urgency to reach a resolution.60 
With respect to damage awards, we would expect that, given 
the symmetric nature of the rule, neither plaintiffs nor defendants 
would receive an advantage.  Assuming that plaintiffs and defendants 
are drawn from the same distribution of the population with respect to 
resources, attitudes towards uncertainty, and costs of litigating a suit, 
damage awards should not increase or decrease, on average, after the 
rule was revised.61  That is consistent with what we observed in our 
analysis.  While average relative awards decreased in New Jersey in 
Period 2, the decrease was not statistically significant. 
We offer one caveat: the fact that the coefficient on damage 
awards is negative suggests that the plaintiffs and defendants in our 
dataset may not be drawn from the same distribution.  Considering 
the litigants in our dataset—individuals versus an insurer—this is 
certainly plausible.  Unlike the insurer, individual plaintiffs are not 
typically repeat players, nor do they have the same resources to 
litigate the suit.  Accordingly, one can argue that individual plaintiffs 
are more risk-averse62 than the insurer, explaining why damage 
 
 59. See supra Part II. 
 60. See Ariel Rubinstein, Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model, 50 ECONOMETRICA 97, 
108 (1982) (stating how opposing parties’ discounting of time affects their relative distribution of 
payouts). 
 61. One may argue, pursuant to Shavell and Katz, that the rule would lower damage 
awards as plaintiffs withdraw from filing low-probability-of-prevailing claims. See Shavell, supra 
note 27, and Katz, supra note 27. While true, this ignores the possibility that the rule may 
encourage plaintiffs with high-probability-of-prevailing claims (but with relatively low expected 
awards) to file suit. Again, assuming plaintiffs and defendants are drawn from the same 
distribution, there is no reason to expect any bias. 
 62. A risk-neutral person is one who is indifferent between choices that produce the same 
expected outcome, e.g., she is indifferent between receiving $10 or a 10% chance for $100, since 
both produce the same expected outcome of $10. A risk-averse individual prefers a lower payout 
that is guaranteed to a higher expected payout that is uncertain, e.g., she prefers a guaranteed 
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awards decreased after Rule 4:58 was revised.  But this is mere 
speculation, since the decline we observed was not statistically 
significant. 
Even if damage awards do not change, some legal theorists 
have argued that the threat of cost-shifting increases the likelihood of 
settlement by encouraging litigants to be more generous in their 
offers.63  Our findings on settlement rate, reported in Table 7, do not 
support this proposition. 
 
Table 7 
Rate of Settlement - Period 1 vs. Period 2 
 
New Control Control States
Jersey States - New Jersey
Period 1 99.19% 96.97% -2.22%***
[3,084] [12,394] [15,478]
Period 2 98.99% 96.69% -2.30%***
[3,166] [12,828] [15,478]
Period 1 -0.20% -0.29% -0.09%
   - Period 2 [6,250] [25,222] [31,472]
Note : Figures drawn from suits where mode of resolution is reported.  This variable was 
completed for 75.8% of the total sample.
*** Significant at the 99% confidence level, two-tailed test.  
 
The settlement rate for New Jersey and the control states, 
while statistically significant from one another for each period, did not 
dramatically change before and after the rule’s revision.  The 
difference-in-difference estimate, -0.09 percent, actually runs counter 
to the prediction, but is small and not statistically significant.  This 
result can hardly provide a refutation of the theory: our analysis looks 
at a subsection of civil litigation—insurance suits—where the baseline 
settlement rate is very high,64 making it difficult for settlement rates 
to significantly increase. 
 
payout of $9 to an expected payout of $10, but with a 50% chance of $20 and a 50% of $0. See 
DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 314 (1994). 
 63. See Miller, supra note 34, at 124; see also Spier, supra note 35, at 211 (“[B]y increasing 
his offer, the defendant both reduces probability of a trial and reduces his expected cost 
contingent upon reaching trial.”). 
 64. The settlement rate in this dataset is higher than other estimates. See Marc Galanter, 
The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 
1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 461 (2004) (stating that “the portion of dispositions that were 
by trial was less than one-sixth of what it was in 1962 – 1.8 percent now as opposed to 11.5 
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We believe, however, that the intuition underlying the theory 
on settlement rate remains valid but that settlement rate may be too 
blunt an instrument to measure the rule’s effect on the litigation 
process.  If we think of litigation as a dynamic process,65 then duration 
of litigation—rather than settlement rate—may be a more precise 
measure of how the rule promotes resolution.66  In litigation, 
particularly the early stages, the plaintiff and the defendant hold 
sincere but often differing beliefs (probability distribution functions) 
over how the suit would resolve at trial, both with respect to liability 
as well as damages.67  Distinguishable from the litigants’ probability 
distributions is the “true” probability distribution of what would 
happen if the case resolved by trial.  Neither the plaintiff nor 
defendant knows the true distribution.  For example, in Figure 8, 
illustrating a basic civil dispute for money damages, P believes that 
she is entitled to a higher range of damage awards ($7,500 to $10,000) 
than the defendant is willing to pay ($2,500 to $5,000).  The true 
distribution likely lies between the two litigants’ distributions. 
 
percent in 1962”); Galanter & Cahill, supra note 3, at 1339-40 (noting that most estimates find 
that between 85% and 90% of cases resolve before trial). 
 65. For examples of dynamic models of litigation, see Holger Sieg, Estimating a Bargaining 
Model with Asymmetric Information: Evidence from Medical Malpractice Disputes, 108 J. POL. 
ECON. 1006, 1008-15 (2000) (illustrating bargaining strategies and considerations for 
settlements); Joel Waldfogel, The Selection Hypothesis and the Relationship between Trial and 
Plaintiff Victory, 108 J. POL. ECON. 229, 232 (1995) (asserting that selection of suits for trial is a 
function of probability of plaintiff victory at trial). See also Yasutora Watanabe, Learning and 
Bargaining in Dispute Resolution: Theory and Evidence from Medical Malpractice Litigation 
(2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
 66. Our reasoning is based on psychology as much as economic incentives. This point was 
suggested by Kathy Spier during conversation. 
 67. See Gregory Todd Jones & Douglas H. Yarn, Evaluative Dispute Resolution Under 
Uncertainty: An Empirical Look at Bayes’ Theorem and the Expected Value of Perfect 
Information, 2003 J. DISP. RES. 427, 448 (“[A]s a whole, litigants tend to overestimate the 
expected outcomes of potential litigation.”). 
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Figure 8 
Plaintiff and Defendant’s Perception of Dispute Without Offer-of-Judgment Rule 
 
 
 
The litigation process allows for the plaintiff and the defendant 
to acquire more information about the case, in the process learning 
more about the true probability distribution of the suit.  Remaining in 
litigation, however, represents a tradeoff for the litigants: more 
information allows the litigants to be more informed during 
settlement negotiations; this information is costly to obtain, incurring 
expenses in the form of attorneys’ fees, expert witnesses, and 
depositions. Assuming that the true outcome probability distribution 
falls between the litigants individual probability distributions, over 
time the litigants converge towards a mutually acceptable outcome.  
This certainly describes the vast majority of litigants, who ultimately 
do reach a settlement.  Those who do not, by definition, proceed to 
trial. 
A bilateral offer-of-judgment rule reduces the duration of 
litigation by increasing the likelihood of settlement in any given 
period.  One could imagine this could be done in a couple of ways.  The 
first is by encouraging litigants to issue more attractive—i.e., 
generous—offers.  Even if they hold different views over the range of 
outcomes at trial (e.g., their respective probability distribution), each 
litigant knows that a less generous offer within that range is less 
likely to be accepted and less likely to trigger cost-shifting should that 
offer be rejected with a trial to follow.  Conversely, the more generous 
the offer, the more inclined the offeree will be to accept the offer, and 
the more credible the threat of cost-shifting will be if the offeree 
rejects the offer and proceeds to trial.  As the rule is symmetric, the 
plaintiff has an incentive to demand less and the defendant to offer 
more.  In any given period of litigation, the rule may not be enough to 
compel the litigants to reach a settlement, but it should draw them 
closer than they would be in the absence of the rule.  And it is 
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reasonable to believe that being closer to an agreement at the end of 
one period of negotiations increases the likelihood of settlement for the 
next period. 
Second, the rule may inspire parties to settle by making the 
costs of proceeding to trial less attractive.  The intuition here is that 
the outcome at trial is determined, in part, by the resources expended 
by the litigant.  Additional resources not only increase a litigant’s 
likelihood of prevailing, but also the scope of damages.  The issuance 
of pre-trial offers may lead to a game of mutually assured 
destruction,68 where each side will spend an escalating amount of 
resources to achieve an outcome that triggers (or avoids) cost-shifting.  
Given the possibility of a financially catastrophic outcome, litigants 
would prefer to resolve the dispute before trial.69 
The predictions regarding attorneys’ fees are merely a logical 
extension of the predictions on duration of litigation.  In general, 
attorneys’ fees are positively correlated with the time it takes to 
resolve a suit since, all things being equal, litigants incur greater 
attorneys’ fees as litigation proceeds.  If a litigant reaches a resolution 
sooner, it follows that her attorney works fewer hours, thereby 
reducing the litigant’s attorneys’ fees.  We observe precisely that with 
Insurer X’s attorneys’ fees.70  We would also predict that attorneys’ 
fees for plaintiffs would similarly decline in New Jersey following the 
rule revision.  Unfortunately, the data do not allow us to observe how 
much plaintiffs paid their attorneys, which would have allowed us to 
test whether this hypothesis is true, and if so, whether plaintiffs 
enjoyed the same degree of savings. 
At the same time, however, we would expect the downward 
effect of the rule on duration of litigation—and thereby attorneys’ 
fees—should decline as damage awards increase.  The reason is that 
the relationship between attorneys’ fees and damage awards is non-
 
 68. The doctrine of mutually assured destruction (MAD) is rooted in the Cold War and 
nuclear deterrence, and states that adversaries possess enough weaponry to destroy the other 
side and that either side, if attacked for any reason by the other, would retaliate with equal or 
greater force. See STEPHEN J. CIMBALA, THE PAST AND FUTURE OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE 128 
(1998). 
 69. This claim stands in contrast to some of the existing theoretical literature on the effect 
of offer-of-judgment rules on the likelihood of settlement. Some scholars believe that such offers, 
if rejected, create a “dig-in” effect that decreases the likelihood of settlement. See Thomas D. 
Rowe, Jr., Predicting the Effects of Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139, 165 
(1984). These theoretical issues will be explored in future research. See Eric Talley & Albert H. 
Yoon, Offers of Judgment, Credible Commitment, and Asymmetric Information Bargaining, 
(2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors). 
 70. See supra note 51. 
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linear.71  For low damage awards, attorneys’ fees comprise a larger 
part of total expenses and often exceed the damage award.  As damage 
awards grow, however, one would expect that the ratio of attorneys’ 
fees to damage awards decreases. 
 
Table 8 
Insurer X’s Average Damage Award and Attorneys’ fees 
Full Sample, All Years between 1992 and 1997 
 
Range Damage Award Attorneys' Fees N
$0 $0 $6,967 11,988
$1 - $7500 $3,384 $3,949 10,001
$7,501 - $25,000 $14,391 $5,017 9,314
$25,001 and above $110,246 $10,416 10,242  
 
Table 8 substantiates this hypothesis.  For the total sample, 
Insurer X’s attorneys’ fees as a ratio to the damage award decreased 
for each succeeding quartile.  Therefore, if the relationship between 
attorneys’ fees and damage awards is non-linear, one would expect the 
effect of the rule on litigation duration to be non-linear as well.  As the 
size of damage awards increases, the threat of attorneys’ fees as a 
cost-shifting punishment diminishes.  From a purely economic 
perspective, this may be a desirable result.  If litigants are going to 
commit resources into litigation—and be relatively undeterred by an 
offer-of-judgment rule—they should do so where the stakes are 
highest.72 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Using a unique data set provided by a large insurance provider, 
this Article shows that Rule 4:58, after it was revised to abolish the 
cap on attorneys’ fees, had a real effect on insurance-based litigation.  
The change did not occur in the form of reduced or increased damage 
awards, but Insurer X experienced shorter periods of litigation and 
reduced attorneys’ fees in New Jersey, relative to the control states.  
These reductions were substantial and statistically significant.  While 
we do not have the data to confirm this, we would hypothesize that 
plaintiffs also enjoyed lower attorneys’ fees on their end, at least those 
 
 71. This is true even when the attorney is working on a contingency fee basis, since 
attorneys’ fees for the purpose of cost-shifting are based on a reasonable fee and not necessarily 
the agreed-upon contingency percentage. 
 72. The relationship between attorneys’ fees and damage awards is likely more complex. 
The two factors are endogenous: for Insurer X, increased investment in attorneys’ fees likely 
lowers the damage award. 
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whose attorneys billed on an hourly rather than contingency fee 
arrangement. 
What does this study tell us about the efficacy of offer-of-
judgment rules?  We offer two points, one economic and the other 
legal.  First, an offer-of-judgment rule must have a credible cost-
shifting mechanism in order to influence pre-trial negotiations.  This 
point is not lost on commentators of the rule, who have repeatedly 
noted the ineffectiveness of Rule 68—and state rules modeled on Rule 
68—because most litigants are unfazed by having to pay the other 
side’s post-offer court costs.73  The prior version of Rule 4:58 appears 
to have suffered this plight. 
Second, the revised Rule 4:58 illustrates how offer-of-judgment 
rules can provide an attractive means of addressing perceived 
deficiencies in the tort system.  States have experimented with other 
tort reform measures but with mixed results.  Some reforms, such as 
damage caps, are highly effective in reducing the size of damage 
awards but have encountered constitutional resistance in some 
states.74  Other reforms, such as mandatory arbitration, have reduced 
the administrative burden on state courts to adjudicate disputes 
without any appreciable difference in duration of litigation or costs, 
but raise questions about how the process in which arbitration panels 
are constructed.75 
While the merits of any tort reform measure depend on its 
stated objective, the revised Rule 4:58 offers a promising alternative.  
In contrast to damage caps, the rule is not biased against the plaintiff.  
And, unlike arbitration panels, the rule requires less regulation and 
does not raise questions of political capture.  Based on our empirical 
results, one can argue that from a societal perspective, a powerfully 
 
 73. See Edward H. Cooper, Rule 68, Fee Shifting, and the Rulemaking Process, in 
REFORMING THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM 108 (Larry Kramer ed., 1996) (stating that “Rule 68 has 
been viewed by many, including me, as an uninteresting provision that remains on the fringe of 
procedure because it has been little used to scant effect”). 
 74. See, e.g., Albert Yoon, supra note 51, at 216 (showing how damage caps enacted by the 
Alabama legislature in 1987 reduced payouts by an average of $20,000). In a trilogy of cases – 
Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Association, 592 So. 2d 156 (Ala. 1991) ($400,000 cap on economic 
damages), Henderson ex rel Hartsfield v. Alabama Power Co., 627 So. 2d 878 (Ala. 1993), 
($250,000 cap on punitive damages), and Smith v. Schulte & Pulmonary Association of Mobile, 
P.A., 671 So. 2d 1334 (Ala. 1995) ($1,000,000 cap on wrongful death) – the Alabama Supreme 
Court subsequently struck down all damage cap provisions. But see Pulliam v. Coastal 
Emergency Servs., Inc., 509 S.E.2d 307 (Va. 1999) (holding that Virginia’s damage cap provisions 
do not violate the U.S. or Virginia constitutions); Etheridge v. Med. Ctr. Hospis., 376 S.E.2d 525 
(Va. 1989) (same). 
 75. See, e.g., Albert Yoon, Mandatory Arbitration and Civil Litigation: An Empirical Study 
of Medical Malpractice Litigation in the West, 6 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 95, 131 (2004) (describing 
how mandatory arbitration in Nevada resulted in a lower percentage of claims requiring 
resolution in court). 
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symmetrical offer-of-judgment rule enhances social welfare because it 
achieves similar damage awards but with lower transaction costs (e.g., 
time and attorneys’ fees).  Perhaps the only ones who might be worse 
off under this change are the attorneys themselves.  Other states may 
similarly be inspired to follow New Jersey’s example.  Indeed, in the 
aftermath of Rule 4:58’s revision, at least one other state has 
strengthened its existing offer-of-judgment rule.76 
In future work, we intend to examine how litigants apply and 
respond to offer-of-judgment rules.  Is the mere threat of the rule 
enough to motivate litigants in their pre-trial discussion, or do the 
litigants actually make offers to each other?  If so, for what type of 
suits does this occur?  A promising area of comparison would be 
medical malpractice suits, an area of litigation which continues to 
draw the attention of legislators at both the state and federal level. 
 
 
 76. For example, in 1995, Oklahoma passed a comprehensive tort reform bill, of which a 
central component was a bilateral offer-of-judgment rule with attorneys’ fees. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, 
§ 1101.1 (Supp. 1995). 
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Appendix A 
Raw Estimate Difference-in-Difference 
Duration of Litigation
Period 1 Period 2 Period 2 - Period 1
(Jan92-Aug94) (Sept94-Apr97)
New Jersey 34.24 32.69 -1.55***
(0.2733) (0.2970) (0.4034)
[4064] [3998]
Control States 33.61 34.67 1.05***
(0.1534) (0.1542) (0.2176)
[16443] [17040]
(NJ-CS) Difference -0.6153* 1.9806 -2.60***
(0.3372) (0.3492) (0.4585)
Payout
Period 1 Period 2 Period 2 - Period 1
(Jan92-Aug94) (Sept94-Apr97)
New Jersey $27,748 $23,803 -$3,946**
($1,322) ($1,171) ($1,768)
[4064] [3998]
Control States $33,718 $31,377 -$2,340*
($845) ($1,077) ($1,375)
[16443] [17040]
(NJ-CS) Difference $5,969*** $7,575*** -$1,606
($1,822) ($2,294) ($2,234)
Attorneys' Fees
Period 1 Period 2 Period 2 - Period 1
(Jan92-Aug94) (Sept94-Apr97)
New Jersey $5,670 $4,438 -$1,231
($211) ($179) ($277)
[4064] [3998]
Control States $7,245 $6,838 -$406
($161) ($389) ($427)
[16443] [17040]
(NJ-CS) Difference $1,574*** $2,400*** -$825
($341) ($808) ($504)
*** Significant at the 99% confidence level, two-tailed test.
Notes : Data provided by Insurer X for all suits filed between January 1, 1992 and April 30, 1997.  Claims exceeding 7.25 years 
are omitted.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  Control states are Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, and New 
York.  All payout figures are in 2003 dollars, adjusted by the Consumer Price Index.
* Significant at the 90% confidence level, two-tailed test.
** Significant at the 95% confidence level, two-tailed test.
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Appendix B 
Text of N.J. Ct. R. 4:58 
N.J. Ct. R 4:58. Offer of Judgment 
4:58-1. Time and Manner of Making and Accepting Offer 
 
Except in a matrimonial action, any party may, at any time 
more than 20 days before the actual trial date, serve upon any adverse 
party, without prejudice, and file with the court, an offer to take 
judgment in the offeror’s favor, or as the case may be, to allow 
judgment to be taken against the offeror, for a sum stated therein or 
for property or to the effect specified in the offer (including costs). If at 
any time on or prior to the 10th day before the actual trial date the 
offer is accepted, the offeree shall serve upon the offeror and file a 
notice of acceptance with the court. The making of a further offer shall 
constitute a withdrawal of all previous offers made by that party. An 
offer shall not, however, be deemed withdrawn upon the making of a 
counter-offer by an adverse party but shall remain open until accepted 
or withdrawn as is herein provided. If the offer is not accepted on or 
prior to the 10th day before the actual trial date or within 90 days of 
its service, whichever period first expires, it shall be deemed 
withdrawn and evidence thereof shall not be admissible except in a 
proceeding after the trial to fix costs, interest and attorney’s fee. The 
fact that an offer is not accepted does not preclude a further offer 
within the time herein prescribed in the same or another amount or as 
specified therein. 
 
4:58-2. Consequences of Non-acceptance of Claimant’s Offer 
 
If the offer of a claimant is not accepted and the claimant 
obtains a verdict or determination at least as favorable as the rejected 
offer, the claimant shall be allowed, in addition to costs of suit, (a) all 
reasonable litigation expenses incurred following non-acceptance; (b) 
eight per cent interest on the amount of any money recovery from the 
date of the offer or the date of completion of discovery, whichever is 
later; and (c) a reasonable attorney’s fee, which shall belong to the 
client, for such subsequent services as are compelled by the non-
acceptance. In an action for unliquidated damages, however, no 
allowances under this rule shall be granted to the offeror unless the 
amount of the recovery is in excess of 120% of the offer. A claimant 
entitled to interest under R. 4:42-11(b) shall be allowed interest under 
this rule only to the extent it may exceed the interest allowed under R. 
4:42-11(b). 
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4:58-3. Consequences of Non-acceptance of Offer of Party Not a 
Claimant 
 
If the offer of a party other than the claimant is not accepted 
and the determination is at least as favorable to the offeror as the 
offer, the offeror shall be allowed, in addition to costs of suit, litigation 
expenses and attorney’s fee as prescribed by R. 4:58-2, and any such 
allowances shall constitute a prior charge upon the judgment. In an 
action for unliquidated damages, however, no allowances under this 
rule shall be granted to such offeror unless the amount awarded to the 
claimant is in excess of $750.00 and is less than 80 per cent of the 
offer. 
 
4:58-4. Multiple Defendants 
 
If there are multiple defendants against whom a joint and 
several judgment is sought, and one of the defendants offers in 
response less than a pro rata share, that defendant shall, for purposes 
of the allowances under R. 4:58-2 and -3, be deemed not to have 
accepted the claimant’s offer. If, however, the offer of a single 
defendant, whether or not intended as the offer of a pro rated share, is 
at least as favorable to the offeree as the determination of total 
damages to which the offeree is entitled, the single offering defendant 
shall be entitled to the allowances prescribed in R. 4:58-3, provided, 
however, that in an action for unliquidated damages the offeree has 
received at least $750 and that single defendant’s offer is at least 80% 
of the total damages determined.  
 
